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NOTES
PRESCRIBING PREVENTIVE REMEDIES FOR AN AILING PUBLIC
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: REFORMS UNDER THE NEW
MASSACHUSETTS COMPETITIVE BIDDING STATUTE
Competitive bidding statutes are designed to ensure that responsible con-
tractors perform work at the lowest possible cost.' While it is usually not dif-
ficult to determine the lowest bidder on any project, selecting a responsible or
qualified contractor is a more complicated task. 2 Jurisdictions vary in ap-
proaches to choosing responsible contractors for public projects.' The federal
government, for example, has enacted debarment procedures designed to pre-
vent awards to contractors likely to have performance problems.' Certain
' See ALA. CODE S41:16-27 (Michie 1977), CAL. Gov "r CODE S14250 (West 1966),
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, S6907. See also American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 27 Pa. Comm.
639, 643, 367 A.2d 756, 758 (1976) (the law in the field is that even in the absence of a constitu-
tional or statutory requirement that a contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, if in
fact the public authority invites bids, public policy and the economical conduct of governmental
business require that the contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder); O'Brien v.
Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761, 762 (E.D. Mass. 1934) (selection of the lowest "responsible bidder" by
federal officers requires that not only the pecuniary ability but also the judgment, skill, capacity,
and integrity of the bidder be considered); People v. Omen, 290 Ill. 59, 70-71, 124 N.E. 860, 865
(1919) (the phrase "lowest responsible bidder" as used in the local Improvement Act, does not
mean the lowest bidder financially only, but the bidder who by experience and otherwise is most
capable of doing the work in a satisfactory manner); Arglo Printing Corp. v. Board of Educ., 47
Misc. 2d 618, 620-21, 263 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (1965) (corporation's submission of lowest bid on
certain school work did not establish it as the "lowest responsible bidder" within Education Law
provision requiring Board of Education to let all contracts for public works to the lowest respon-
sible bidder). A long line of cases has established that public contracts subject to various
Massachusetts competitive bidding statutes cannot properly be awarded other than to the lowest
eligible bidder. Interstate Engr. Corp. v. City of Fitchburg, 367 Mass. 751, 757, 329 N.E.2d
128, 131 (1975); Gosselin's Dairy, Inc. v. School Comm., 348 Mass. 793, 793, 205 N.E.2d 221,
221 (1965); Rudolph v. City Manager, 341 Mass. 31, 38, 167 N.E.2d 151, 156 (1960); East Side
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Adams, 329 Mass. 347, 354, 108 N.E.2d 659, 663 (1952); Gifford v. Com-
missioner of Public Health, 328 Mass. 608, 610, 105 N.E.2d 476, 478 (1952).
2 See Menke v. Board of Education, Ind. Sch. Dist., 211 N.W.2d 601, 607 (1973)
(Within,the context of statutes directing that contracts be let to the lowest responsible bidder, it
has been held repeatedly that the lowest pecuniary bid is but a single consideration in the deter-
mination as to who is the lowest responsible bidder. Responsibility may embrace factors other
than the low dollar figure, including such considerations as the business judgment of the bidder
and the bidder's record for reliability in performance. Only the exercise of sound discretion by a
public body will satisfy the statute.).
3
 The federal government allows the awarding authority to make the decision regard-
ing a bidder's responsibility. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. S1-1.1205 (1981). Some states have formal pre-
qualification systems and then allow contractors to bid only on contracts within their range of
competence. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. S27:7-35.1-35.12 (West Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE
%1431 (West 1980).
4 P. LATHAM, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES 77 (1980). See, e.g., 41 C.F.R.
1-1.600-.607 (1981); 32 C.F.R. 1-600-610 (1981).
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states have enacted other preventive remedies, such as prequalification to pre-
vent contractors from bidding on projects for which they are unqualified.'
Massachusetts has recently repealed its bidding statute covering public
construction projects and replaced it with one that prescribes new methods
designed to improve the accountability of all parties involved in public con-
struction. 6
 One feature of the new statute is its debarment mechanism which
precludes certain undesirable contractors from receiving public construction
awards.' Another feature of the statute is prequalification, a mandatory
evaluation of prospective bidders' qualifications, which, if concluded adverse-
ly, eliminates contractors from consideration before they enter their bids. 8 The
new competitive bidding statute was adopted as part of an omnibus reform of
public construction law. 9
 The reform legislation was based on the investigation
and recommendations of the Special Commission Concerning State and Coun-
ty Buildings (Special Commission)."
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 427:7-35.1-35.12 (West Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE
51431 (West 1980).
6
 Act of July 17, 1980, ch. 579, 1980 MASS. ACTS 984 (repealing the former com-
petitive bidding statute, codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S§44A-44L, and replacing
it with the new competitive bidding statute, codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149,
5544A-44H (West Supp. 1980). There has been a succession of competitive bidding statutes in
Massachusetts since 1939. The Act of August 12, 1939, ch. 480, 1939 MASS. ACTS 654 added to
the General Laws the original Chapter 149, sections 44A-44D. The Act of June 10, 1954, ch.
645, 1954 MASS. ACTS 641, sections 1-4 added section 44E and amended certain previously ex-
isting sections. These sections were further amended by the Act of May 1, 1956, ch. 309, 1950
MASS. ACTS 183 and the Act of June 28, 1956, ch. 493, 1956 MASS. ACTS 364, which were
subsequently stricken out by the Act of August 10, 1956, ch. 679, 1956 MASS. ACTS 628 which
added in their place new sections 44A-44L, of the Massachusetts General Laws Annotated,
relating to the same subject matter. There have been many subsequent amendments to MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, SS44A-44L in the years up until 1980 when they were repealed in
their entirety and replaced by the Act of July 17, 1980, ch. 579, 1980 MASS. ACTS 987.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44C (West Supp. 1980).
Id. at ch. 149, S44D.
9
 Act of July 17, 1980, ch. 579, 1980 MASS. ACTS 984 (Public Construction Reform
Act of 1980). This act addresses many areas of public construction law including, but not limited
to, administration of real property, id. at 918-26, land use and acquisition, id. at 927-35, con-
struction site management, id. at 935-44, designer selection, id. at 971-82, and contractor selec-
tion, it at 984-1002.
Two additional laws were passed during the same legislative session which lend sup-
port to this new system of public construction. The first law, Act of July 5, 1980, ch. 388, 1980
MASS. ACTS 485, establishes an Office of Inspector General to investigate fraud, waste, and
other abuses in the expenditure of public funds on supplies or construction. Id. The second law,
Act of July 15, 1980, ch. 531, 1980 MASS. ACTS 726, makes false statements and fraud
perpetrated in connection with public construction contracting criminal offenses. Id.
i° The Special Commission was created by Resolve of April 12, 1978, ch. 5, 1978
MASS. RESOLVES 1027 as amended by Resolve of July 23, 1979, ch. 11, 1979 MASS. RESOLVES
926 and Act of June 10, 1980, di. 257, 1980 MASS. ACTS 209. The Special Commission received
a legislative mandate to investigate, as a basis for legislative reform, the existence of corrupt prac-
tices and maladministration in the award of contracts related to the construction of state and
county buildings since 1968. See Resolve of April 17, 1978, ch. 5, 1978 MASS. RESOLVES 1027.
After a year of investigation, the Special Commission concluded that the management
of public construction was inefficient, susceptible to influence, and could not guarantee the quali-
ty of the work performed. SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING STATE AND COUNTY BUILDING,
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This note analyzes the recently enacted Massachusetts competitive bid-
ding statute. First, the note will describe the former competitive bidding
statute's provisions dealing with contractor qualifications as well as the Special
Commission's findings regarding the former statute's efficacy. Next, the new
competitive bidding statute's preventive remedies will be described. Specifi-
cally, the statute's debarment mechanism, pre-bid evaluation process, and
procedure for selecting subcontractors will be explained in detail. These pre-
ventive remedies of the new statute are, then, evaluated in a two part analysis.
The first part analyzes the likely effect of the new statute's debarment provi-
sions in preventing undesirable contractors from participating in competitive
public bidding. It will be submitted that debarment will not be imposed fre-
quently because its invocation requires high procedural standards. Thus, the
debarment mechanism may not uphold the integrity of the bidding process.
The second part analyzes whether the new provisions designed to prevent un-
qualified contractors from obtaining particular contracts will succeed. The sec-
ond part reviews the various statutory provisions applicable to general contrac-
tors and subcontractors. It will be submitted that the new provisions which ap-
ply to general contractors are unworkable and may produce worse results than
the former provisions. It will be recommended that awarding authorities
minimize the evaluation of prospective bidders and exercise their right to reject
unqualified bidders prior to the award. With regard to the provisions ap-
plicable to subcontractors, the new provisions are virtually identical to the pro-
visions operative under the former statute. Because of this similarity, it is sub-
mitted that unqualified subcontractors will continue to undermine the quality
of public buildings constructed in the future. Thus, several legislative and ad-
ministrative modifications of the subcontractor provisions will be recommend-
ed to give subcontractor qualifications appropriate consideration.
I. PREVENTIVE REMEDIES BEFORE THE NEW COMPETITIVE BIDDING STATUTE
Under Massachusetts's former competitive bidding statute, there were no
formal procedures for preventing awards of public construction contracts to
general contractors likely to have performance problems. Despite the lack of
formal procedures to evaluate qualifications, courts noted that a purpose of the
statute was to have work done by competent general contractors and subcon-
tractors." Under the former statute, general contracts were awarded to the
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING
STATE AND COUNTY BUILDINGS 3 (December 5, 1979) (hereinafter cited as SUMMARY OF
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS). For the entire findings, recommendations, and history of
the Special Commission see, SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING STATE AND COUNTY
BUILDINGS 1-10 FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING STATE AND COUN-
TY BUILDINGS, (December 31, 1980) (hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT). This multivolumed
document provides much of the evidence and rationale for the three acts passed in 1980 relating
to public discussion.
" Rudolph v. City Manager of Cambridge, 341 Mass. 31, 38, 167 N.E.2d 151, 156
(1960). Fred C. McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. Westfield Trade High School Bldg. Comm.,
345 Mass. 267, 273, 186 N.E.2d 911, 916 (1962).
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"lowest responsible and eligible bidder."" More specifically, the statute re-
quired that among those bidders possessing the skill, ability, and integrity
necessary to perform the work, the lowest bidder obtain the contract." Each
public awarding authority could demand that a bidder submit essential infor-
mation regarding his qualifications to perform a particular contract." There
was, however, no requirement that an awarding authority solicit or consider
such information." Nevertheless, the statute did permit awarding authorities
to reject any bids if doing so was in the public interest.' 6 Whether a bidder was
incompetent to perform the project was a question for the awarding authority
to decide; the issue could not be determined by the courts."
The former competitive bidding statute also had no formal procedures for
preventing awards to subcontractors likely to have performance problems.
Under the statute, subcontracts were awarded through a filed subbid system."
This system mandated that specifications for all proposed construction projects
be divided into seventeen or more separate subsections." Awarding authorities
then solicited subbids for each of the project's subsections. 20 The awarding
authorities, however, reserved the right to reject any subbid if it determined
that the subbidder was not competent to perform the work as specified. 2 '
Under Massachusetts's filed subbid system, an interested subbidder filed
his bid directly with the awarding authority" and was required to make certain
assurances that, if selected, he would perform adequately." Furthermore, the
statute prescribed a bid form which required a subbidder to submit certain in-
formation regarding his qualifications. 24 Once a subbidder filed a bid, he could
not vary it" and, unless the subbidder affirmatively exercised an option to pro-
' 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544A (West Supp. 1980) (repealed 1980). In perti-
nent part the statute stated, "[E]very contract for the construction, reconstruction, alteration,
remodeling, repair or demolition of any building by the commonwealth or by any governmental
unit thereof shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible bidder on the basis of com-
petitive bids." As used in the former statute, "governmental unit thereof" included every coun-
ty, city, town, district, board, commission and other public body. Id.
'3 Id.
" Id.
' 5 Id. The operative language was "[e]ssential information in regard to such qualifica-
tions shall be submitted in such form as the awarding authority may require." Id. (emphasis sup-
plied).
16 Id. at ch. 149, 544D. See Builders Realty Corp. of Mass. v. City of Newton, 348
Mass. 64, 66, 201 N.E.2d 825, 826 (1964) (city could reject bidder who had not complied in
every respect of bidding procedure).
L' Fred C. McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. Westfield Trade High School Bldg.
Comm., 345 Mass. 267, 273-74, 186 N.E.2d 911, 916 (1962).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 5440 (West 1971) (repealed 1980).
' Id.
2° Id. at 544D.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 544G.
24 Id.
25 Id. See Interstate Engr. Corp. v. City of Fitchburg, 367 Mass. 751, 758-60, 329
N.E.2d 128, 132-33 (1975).
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hibit certain general contractors from using his bid," the subbidder was bound
to every general contractor using his subbid. 27
Under the statute, awarding authorities had little time to review subbids.
The statute required that subbids be opened publicly only four days before the
date fixed for the opening of general bids." Within two days of their opening,
subbids were to be reviewed by awarding authorities and rejected if defective. 29
Failure to reject a subbid at this time did not prevent an awarding authority
from subsequently rejecting the offer." Then, no less than two days before the
opening of general bids was scheduled, the awarding authority mailed to each
prospective general bidder a list of filed subbidders. 3 ' General bidders could
only choose subbidders listed by the awarding authority." Within that list, the
general bidder was free to choose any subbidder he preferred, regardless of
price."
The interposition of the awarding authority between the general contrac-
tor and the subcontractors was designed to put all general contractors on equal
terms with respect to bids from subcontractors." Specifically, the filed subbid
system was designed to prevent bid shopping and bid peddling." Bid shopping
occurs when a general contractor uses the low bid of one subcontractor as a
wedge in bargaining for lower subbids from other subcontractors." Bid ped-
dling is an attempt by one subcontractor to undercut known bid prices of other
subcontractors in order to obtain a contract." These practices have long been
considered unethical by construction trade associations" and detrimental to
the subbid market as well as to the quality of the finished product." By forcing
26 Id.
27 Id. at S44H.
29 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44H (West 1971) (repealed 1980).
25
 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
" The statute provided only that.a "person shall not be named by a general bidder as a
sub-bidder for a sub-trade [on] the general bid form unless such person is included for such sub-
trade in said list." Id. See Interstate Engr. Corp. v. City of Fitchburg, 367 Mass. 751, 763, 324
N.E.2d 128, 134 (1975) (Wilkins, J., dissenting) (a general contractor is free to select a subbidder
who is not the lowest, at the risk of elevating its own bid and loosing the general contract).
34 Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health, 328 Mass. 608, 615, 105 N. E.2d 476,
481 (1952).
" 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 297. "Cutting through all the rhetoric of its pro-
ponents, the [filed subbid] system is designed with one purpose in mind: to prevent bid shopping
and bid peddling." For the Special Commission's findings with regard to bid shopping and bid
peddling under the filed subbid system see 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 297-306.
36 Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontract Construction Industry, 18
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 389, 394 (1970).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 394 n.24 (citing American Institute of Architects, Handbook of Architectural Practice,
Bk. III, at 702 (1958); Code of Ethics of the Associated General Contractors of America §3 (1964)).
39 See CAL. GOV'T CODE $4101 (West 1980).
The legislature finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling in connec-
tion with the construction, alteration, and repair of public improvements often
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general bidders and subbidders to deal only through the awarding authority,
the filed subbid system attempted to reduce the potential for bid shopping and
bid peddling.
While the former competitive bidding statute allowed awarding
authorities to refuse awards to general contractors and subcontractors likely to
have performance problems," the statute did not provide express guidelines for
the awarding authorities to follow when making such determinations. Further,
the statute did not require awarding authorities to examine the qualifications of
bidders. Apart from the former competitive bidding statute, however, Massa-
chusetts law did provide two methods for preventing general contractors and
subcontractors from obtaining public construction contracts which remain in
effect today.
First, a finding that a contractor was violating an administratively deter-
mined wage rate was grounds for disqualification under Massachusetts law."
Violation of that law meant a contractor was prohibited from contracting with
public agencies, directly or indirectly, for the construction of any public
building or other public works project." Presumably, this disqualification, or
debarment, applied equally to general contractors and subcontractors." The
first conviction for violating the wage rate resulted in a six-month debarment,'"
while the second conviction resulted in debarment for a period of three years."
Second, in addition to a violation of the existing wage rate, a violation of
Executive Order 147 provided grounds for disqualification." That executive
order provided for the temporary suspension or more prolonged debarment of
contractors guilty of crimes relating to obtaining or performing public con-
tracts, or reflecting adversely on a contractor's business integrity." The order
applied with equal force to general contractors and subcontractors, as well as
providers of goods and services related to construction." Violation of the
prevailing wage rate and the executive order were the two express means by
which a contractor was disqualified from obtaining public construction con-
tracts.
Under the former competitive bidding statute, then, awarding authorities
were empowered to refuse awards to contractors likely to have performance
result in poor quality of material and workmanship to the detriment of the public,
deprive the public of the full benefits of fair competition among prime contractors
and subcontractors, and lead to insolvencies, loss of wages to employees, and other
evils.
Id. See also Comment, supra note 36, at 396, 396 n.30 (1970).
" See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
" MASS. GEN. Taws ANN. ch . 149, 5270 (West Supp. 1980).
47 Id.
" See id.
" Id.
" Id.
46
 Executive Order No, 147 issued on October 31, 1979, by Governor Dukakis.
" Id.
48 Id.
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problems or where a refusal was deemed in the public interest. No formal pro-
cedures, however, existed to ensure that rational evaluations of prospective
contractors occurred. Indeed, the authorities were under no obligation even to
examine the qualifications of bidders. The only express means of disqualifying
undesirable candidates was to establish a violation of the existing wage rate or
Executive Order 147.
II. THE SPECIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
The former competitive bidding statute drew harsh criticisms from the
Special Commission during the course of its investigation." The Special Com-
mission concluded that the management of public construction in Massachu-
setts was inefficient, susceptible to outside influence, and could not guarantee
the quality of the work performed." The Commission blamed the combination
of a low-bid system with the lack of an effective qualification evaluation process
for these failings." The Special Commission found that, without regard to his
qualifications, the general contractor who submitted the lowest bid was award-
ed the construction contract." Although awarding authorities were allowed to
examine a general bidder's qualifications," the Commission found that no
serious effort was made to screen out general bidders with inferior qualifica-
tions."
According to the Commission, a major reason that no serious effort was
made to evaluate candidates was that the awarding authorities feared litigation
would ensue if a low bidder was denied a contract." Such a lawsuit might have
charged the awarding authority with engaging in favoritism. The authorities
were concerned that they lacked the tools to defend such a suit." The Commis-
49 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 10-11; 8 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 10, at 344.
5° SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 3.
53 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 343.
52 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 10-11. The
Special Commission summarized its findings with regard to general contractor selection as
follows:
Under Massachusetts law, the general contractor who submits the lowest bid, with
rare exception, is awarded the construction contract. In too many cases the lowest
bidder is not well qualified to undertake the work, and shoddy workmanship
results. Even a contractor with a long history of problems on prior jobs will be ac-
cepted if he is the low bidder. In other cases, firms which have disregarded or
violated state law or failed to comply with public regulations may be permitted to
benefit from public employment.
Id.
55
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44A (repealed 1980). See supra notes 11-17 and ac-
companying text.
54 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 344.
" Id.
56 Id. One awarding authority made some effort to gather information regarding a bid-
der's qualifications. For twenty-five years, the Bureau of Building Construction (BBC) required
that the lowest general bidder complete a statement of qualifications in order to determine
responsibility and eligibility. Id. at 345. In the memory of one BBC official, whose responsibility
it was to oversee the bidding process, the statement was never used to disqualify a bidder. Id.
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sion observed that the prior performance of contractors was rarely docu-
mented, and that the awarding authorities lacked both the manpower to check
the 'references given by bidders and the legal counsel to formulate procedures to
follow in a disqualification proceeding. 57
 The combination of these factors
made the authorities reluctant to risk a lawsuit by a spurned low bidder,
whatever his qualifications."
The Commission noted that the lack of evaluation that flawed the former
statute's treatment of general contractors plagued the statute's filed subbid
system as wel1. 55
 The filed subbid system did allow awarding authorities to re-
ject bids from subcontractors deemed incompetent to perform." The Special
Commission found, however, that there was less review of subbidders'
qualifications than of general bidders'. 6 ' One major awarding authority
reviewed subbids only for formal defects because of the short time period allot-
ted by the 'statute to such a review. 62
 While time pressures make the cursory
evaluation understandable, the result was, nevertheless, that awarding
authorities did not screen subbidders on the basis of their qualifications. 63
Just as the awarding authorities failed to screen subbidders adequately, so
too did the general contractors, selecting their subcontractors through the filed
subbid system, neglect to review the subbidders' qualifications. The Special
Commission found that awarding authorities usually selected the lowest
available general bidder, without regard to his past performance." Thus, to re-
. main price-competitive with their peers, general contractors felt compelled to
use the lowest available subbidders, secure in the knowledge that they were not
liable for the subcontractor's performance. 65
 In choosing subcontractors not
among the lowest of those listed by the awarding authorities, general contrac-
tors risked any chance of winning the contract. 66
 Every general bidder, accord-
ing to the Special Commission, had to assume that there would be at least one
other general bidder who would use the lowest subbidder, regardless of the
quality of that subcontractor's past performance. 67
 Thus, an overemphasis on
the subcontractor's competence could price the general contractor out of the
" Id.
se Id.
59 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-3. The Special Commission had an assortment
of other criticisms of the filed subbid system. Those criticisms included the system's inability to
stop bid shopping and bid peddling, 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 329-30, its cumbersome
administration, 7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 330, its high cost, id. at 331, and its denial of
access to the process to a large number of subcontractors, 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at
330-31.
6° See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text for a description of the filed subbid
system.
61 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-3.
6' 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 293. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text
for explanation of the shortness of time to review subbids.
65
 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-3.
64
 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 10-11.
65
 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 295.
66 Id. at 294,
67 Id.
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market. The Special Commission believed that the only factor which would
force a general contractor to reject the lowest subbidder because of its history of
poor performance would be the general contractor's ability to win future
awards was damaged by a subcontractor's poor performance."
The Special Commission found the express means by which contractors
could be debarred or suspended from contracting with public agencies —
establishing a violation of the prevailing wage rate or Executive Order 147 —
of little generative force in preventing unqualified contractors from obtaining
contracts. 69 The Special Commission discovered that the wage rate began to be
enforced only recently," and that even if compliance were vigorously enforced,
the problems created by other dishonest or incompetent contractors would not
be addressed. 7 I As for the effect of Executive Order 147, the Commission
found no reported case of the Order's enforcement resulting in debarment or
suspension." In fact, the Special Commission reported that the largest award-
ing authority was ignorant of the Executive Order's existence."
In summary, preventive remedies under the old competitive bidding
statute were limited to discretionary initiatives to review bidders' qualifications
which were seldom utilized. The express means outside the old statute to debar
or suspend contractors were unenforced. The ineffective use of such preventive
remedies allowed incompetent or irresponsible general contractors and subcon-
tractors to be selected for public projects. That such contractors have per-
formed a substantial portion of the public construction projects in
Massachusetts is evidenced by the Special Commission's projected cost of
repairing public structures. Since 1968, Massachusetts taxpayers have paid
$17 billion for public construction projects, 74 and the Special Commission
estimated that over the next ten years taxpayers will spend an additional $848
million repairing those same structures." The Special Commission concluded
that a prime cause for this abysmal performance was a competitive bidding
system that selected the lowest priced general bidder without regard to the bid-
der's qualifications." This conclusion provoked the Special Commission to
recommend the erection of significant procedural barriers to prevent un-
qualified and irresponsible contractors from obtaining public construction con-
tracts. 77 The Massachusetts legislature responded with a new competitive bid-
ding statute.
66 Id.
69 Id. at 346.
" Id. at 347.
" Id. at 346. Debarment for violation of the prevailing wage rate, the Commission
noted, does help ensure the quality of workmanship by guaranteeing public construction workers
a fair wage. Id.
72 Id.
" Id.
" 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 2-1.
" Id. 2-2 to 2-3.
76
 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 343.
77 See SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 10, at 12.
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III. PREVENTIVE REMEDIES IN THE NEW COMPETITIVE BIDDING STATUTE
The new competitive bidding statute' prescribes two new procedures to
prevent awards to contractors likely to have performance problems." The new
statute extends the use of debarment to preclude certain contractors from con-
sideration for public projects." In addition, the statute requires awarding
authorities to undertake a pre-bid evaluation of prospective general bidders'
qualifications. 81 This section of the note first describes the statute's expansion
of debarment procedures and then examines the pre-bid evaluation provisions
of the statute. Finally, the treatment of subbidders under the new statute will
be considered.
A. Expansion of Debarment Procedures
The new competitive bidding statute includes a broad debarment
mechanism. Debarment is possible under other provisions of Massachusetts
law." The new statute's debarment provisions, modeled on the debarment
standards found in federal government regulations, 83 provides that a contrac-
tor may be prohibited from bidding on public construction contracts for en-
gaging in a variety of criminal and non-criminal practices." Conviction for a
criminal offense relating to the performance, acquisition or attempt to acquire
a private or public contract or subcontract and conviction for an offense in-
dicating a lack of business integrity are but two types of criminal activity for
which a contractor may be debarred." Additionally, the Deputy Commis-
78
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §§44A-441-I (West Supp. 1980).
79 Id. at g44C, 44D.
88 Id. at §44C. See „supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a description of debar-
ment mechanisms available before the new competitive bidding statute.
81 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44D (West Supp. 1980).
" See supra notes 41 -48 and accompanying text for a description of debarment for viola-
tions of the prevailing wage rate and Executive Order 147.
83 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 353. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41
C.F.R. 1-1.600-1.607 (1981).
84 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44C (West Supp. 1980).
85 Id. at §44C(3)(a). There are many criminal offenses for which debarment may be im-
posed. The statute provides:
(3) Debarment may be imposed for any of the following causes,
(a) Conviction of final adjudication by a court or administrative agency of
competent jurisdiction of any of the following offenses:
(i) a criminal offense incident to obtaining or attempting to obtain a public or
private contract or subcontract, or in the performance of such contract or subcon-
tract; (ii) a criminal offense involving embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery,
falsification or destruction of records, receiving stolen property or any other of-
fense indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty which seriously
and directly affects the contractor's present responsibility as a public contractor;
(iii). a violation of state or federal antitrust laws arising out of the submission of
bids or proposals; (iv) a violation of state or federal laws regulating campaign con-
tributions; (v) a violation of any state or federal laws regulating hours of labor,
prevailing wages, minimum wages, overtime pay, equal pay or child labor; (vi) a
violation of any state or general law prohibiting discrimination in employment;
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sioner of Capital Planning and Operations may debar contractors who engage
in certain non-criminal activities upon determination based on clear and con-
vincing evidence." Depending upon the seriousness of the offense, debarment
may last for a period of up to five years. 87
Debarment may be used as a remedy against a host of construction entities
including general contractors, subcontractors, and affiliates of such entities."
During a period of debarment, bids for any public construction project will not
be solicited or considered from debarred entities. 89 Presumably because of the
seriousness of the debarment remedy, 9 ° the statute grants certain procedural
(vii) repeated or aggravated violation of any state or federal law regulating labor
relations or occupational health or safety.
Id.
86 Id. at 544C(3)(b). The statute provides that debarment may be imposed by:
(b) Clear and convincing evidence as determined by the deputy commis-
sioner of the commission of any of the following acts: (i) willful supplying of
materially false information incident to obtaining or attempting to obtain or per-
forming any public contract or subcontract; (ii) willful failure to comply with the
record-keeping and accounting requirements set forth in section thirty-nine R of
chapter thirty; (iii) a record of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance
in accordance with the terms of one or more public contracts, provided that such
failure to perform or unsatisfactory performance has occurred within a reasonable
period of time preceding the determination to debar and provided further that
such failure to perform or unsatisfactory performance was not caused by factors
beyond the contractor's control; (iv) any other cause affecting the responsibility of
a contractor which the deputy commissioner determines to be of such serious and
compelling nature as to warrant debarment.
Id.
Of particular note are the record-keeping requirements. Every contractor engaged in a
public contract must maintain business records which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the contractor. For contracts in excess of $100,000, the
contractor must file a statement of management disclosing its internal control of assets prior to
execution of the contract, reviewed by a certified public accountant and accompanied by the cer-
tified public accountant's statement of review. A financial statement is alsO required for contracts
valued over $100,000 which is based on and is prescribed by statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch . 30, S39 R (West Supp. 1980).
87
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544C(1) (West Supp. 1980).
" Id. The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Contractor" means any person or entity that has furnished or seeks to fur-
nish goods or services under contract with a public agency or with an acquisition,
planning, design, construction, demolition, installation, repair or maintenance of
any capital facility. Contractors subject to this section shall include, but shall not
be limited to, general contractors, subcontractors, materials suppliers and ven-
dors, and suppliers of architectural, engineering, construction management,
testing, land surveying and consultant services. Employees of a public agency who
furnish goods or services in the course of their employment shall not be subject to
this section.
"Affiliates" means entities which are affiliates of each other when either
directly or indirectly one concern or individual controls or has the power to control
another, or when a third party controls or has the power to control both.
Id.
Debarment may also include all known affiliates of a contractor. Id. at 544C(6).
89 Id. at 444C(7).
9° See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) where then Circuit Judge
Warren Burger stated on the subject of federal debarment:
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safeguards to contractors subject to debarment." For example, the statute
specifies that no contractor may be debarred without first having received suffi-
cient notice92 and an opportunity to be heard. 93 In the course of weighing the
evidence in a debarment proceeding, the statute admonishes the fact finder to
take all facts and circumstances into account." Debarment may be removed or
reduced upon application supported by documenting evidence setting forth ap-
propriate grounds for relief. 95 Appropriate grounds for relief are newly
discovered material evidence, reversal of a judgment or conviction, bona fide
change of ownership or management, or the elimination of the causes for which
the debarment was initially imposed. 96
Debarment procedures and determinations are entirely centralized in the
Division of Capital Planning and Operations." The Special Commission con-
sidered it appropriate to centralize the procedures in order to assure strictly
The impact of debarment on a contractor may be a sudden contraction of bank
credit, adverse impact on the market price of shares of listed stock ... and critical
uneasiness of creditors generally, to say nothing of "loss of face" in the business
community.
Id.
Although debarment at the state level represents, perhaps, a lesser financial loss than at
the national level, the difference is only one of degree. Smaller state or local companies may be
affected as deeply by a state debarment as would a national enterprise by a federal debarment.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544C(5) (West Supp. 1980). The statute provides
in pertinent part:
(5) Except as provided in section twenty-seven C of this chapter, no contrac-
tor may be debarred unless the deputy commissioner has first informed the con-
tractor sought to be debarred by written notice of the proposed debarment mailed
by registered or certified mail to the contractor's last known address. The notice
shall inform the contractor of the reasons for the proposed debarment and shall
state that the contractor will be accorded an opportunity for a hearing if s/he so re-
quests within fourteen days of receipt of the notice. A hearing requested under this
section shall be conducted by the deputy commissioner or his/her designee within
thirty days of receipt of the request, unless the deputy commissioner grants addi-
tional time therefor. The hearing shall be conducted according to the rules for the
conduct of adjudicatory hearings established by the commissioner of administra-
tion pursuant to chapter thirty A. A debarment shall not be imposed until (i) four-
teen days after receipt by the contractor of notice of the proposed debarment if no
hearing is requested, or (ii) the issuance of a written decision by the deputy com-
missioner or his/her designee which makes specific findings that there is clear and
convincing evidence to support the debarment and that debarment for the period
specified in the decision is required to protect the integrity of the public contracting
process. A contractor shall be notified forthwith of the decision by registered or
certified mail, and of his/her right to judicial review in the event that the decision is
adverse to the contractor.
Id.
Section 27C, the exception above, is debarment for violation of the prevailing wage
rate.
92 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544C(5) (West Supp. 1980).
93 Id.
" Id. at 544C(4).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 544C(2)(g).
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uniform application, given that debarment is of such serious consequence to
the contractor." The Commission also determined that centralization would
not impose an undue administrative burden on the Division since it was not
anticipated that debarment would be imposed frequently." Under these new
statutory procedures, debarment eliminates serious offenders of honest
business practices from consideration for public construction projects before
the bidding even begins.'°° Assuming a general contractor is not debarred, his
qualifications for a particular construction project will yet be scrutinized by the
awarding authority pursuant to the second major reform of the new com-
petitive bidding statute by a system of prequalification.'°'
B. Evaluation of the Qualifications of Prospective General Bidders
The new competitive bidding statute requires a general contractor to
demonstrate that he has the requisite skill, ability, and integrity to perform
faithfully the work called for by a particular contract.'" Each awarding
authority bases its evaluation of whether a general contractor has made such a
showing upon information regarding competent workmanship and financial
soundness'" contained in two documents which every prospective general bid-
der must file: the prequalification statementi" and the application to bid.'"
Before a bid can be accepted the statute requires a prospective general bid-
der successfully to complete and file a prequalification statement 106 which
discloses detailed information on the applicant's organization and
experience,'" as well as on its financial condition.'" The statement, however,
need not be filed in conjunction with every prospective bid. Rather, it is filed
only on an annual basis.'" In addition to the specific statutory disclosure re-
9a 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 352-53.
99 Id.
10°
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44C(7) (West Supp. 1980).
'° 1 Id. at $44D.
'" Id. at $44D(1), (2). Similar considerations existed under the prior law, but no
demonstration was required. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, 544A (West Supp. 1980)
(repealed 1980).
1 " MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44A(1) (West Supp. 1980).
'° Id. at §44D.
'" Id. This evaluation process focuses exclusively on general contractors, the statute
specifically excludes subcontractors from the evaluation process. Id. at $44D(9).
1°6
	 GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44D(1) (West Supp. 1980).
1" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544D(1)(a) (West Supp. 1980). Specifically, the
information includes the applicant's form of organization, its key personnel and principal
owners, its experience on public and private construction projects over the past five years; and all
legal or administrative proceedings currently pending against it or concluded adversely to it
within the past five years which relate to public or private contracts. Id.
108 Id. As part of the prequalification statement, an applicant must file a statement of
financial condition from a certified public accountant. Id. This financial statement must delineate
the applicant's current assets and liabilities, plant and equipment; bank and credit references, as
well as its bonding capacity and bonding company. Id,
1" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44D(1) (West Supp. 1980). The statement may
be filed with the Commonwealth's Division of Capital Planning and Operations. Id.
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quirements, the Deputy Commissioner of the Division of Capital Planning and
Operations, authorized under the statute to prescribe a form for the pre-
' qualification statement,"° may require any additional information relevant to
the qualifications and responsibility of the bidder." The statement must be
signed under the penalty of perjury. 12
 Furthermore, a materially false state-
ment may result in the termination of any contract awarded the applicant, and
constitutes a ground for debarment from future public work." Access to pre-
qualification statements is restricted to awarding authorities; they are not open
to public inspection." 4
 While the prequalification statement supplies awarding
authorities with the applicant's general characteristics, more specific informa-
tion is submitted by the applicant in the application to bid.
Unlike the prequalification statement, the application to bid must be filed
in conjunction with every contract in which an applicant has an interest." 5
Primarily, the application to bid brings current the information contained in
the prequalification statement.'" The application to bid also must include the
percentage of uncompleted work on projects currently under contract by pro-
spective bidders, as well as the dollar amount of all outstanding bids for con-
tracts presently under negotiation.'" In addition, the statute requires that the
applicant submit the names and qualifications of personnel who will have
supervisory responsibility for the performance of the contract.'" The Deputy
Commissioner of Capital Planning and Operations, pursuant to the statute,"°
has prescribed a form for this application to bid.' 2° In keeping with the statute's
prescriptions, the Deputy Commissioner's form basically requires applicants to
file an update of their prequalification statement, with the addition of the
"° MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(1)(a) (West Supp. 1980). The Deputy Com-
missioner has prescribed such a form. See 1 MASS. ADMIN. REG. 11-19 (1980) (superseded).
Recently, the form was revised and now calls for listings of construction projects under progress
and recently completed, along with certain information regarding the contractor's performance
on each project listed. See Deputy Commissioner of Capital Planning and Operations, Guidelines
for Prequalification Procedure, issued on March 22, 1982, by the Deputy Commissioner of Capital
Planning and Operations (unpublished) (hereinafter cited as NEW GUIDELINES).
I " MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(1)(a) (West Supp. 1980).
'
14 Id.
1 " Id. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new debar-
ment mechanism.
" 4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(1)(a) (West Supp. 1980). Two considera-
tions entered into the decision to close prequalification statements to public inspection. First, the
Special Commission felt that information included in the statements concerning an applicant's
business organization and financial condition are not matters of public concern and should not be
accessible to competitors. 8 FINAL REPQRT, supra note 10, at 349. Second, the more publicity
given to documents used for evaluation, the greater the danger, real or apparent, the Special
Commission felt, of ensuing lawsuits. Id.
114 Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(2) (West Supp. 1980).
"6 See id.
" 7 Id. at §44D(1)(6).
"8 Id.
"9 Id.
120 See 1 MASS. ADMIN. REG. 20, 28 (1981) (superseded).
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names and resumes of supervising personnel who will be assigned to the proj-
ect. 121
In general the prequalification statement and the application to bid com-
prise the bases for evaluating the qualifications of a prospective bidder.'" But
beyond the information contained in the statements filed by each prospective
general bidder, the statute allows awarding authorities to consider written
evaluations of the applicant's performance on private or public projects over
the past five years whenever they are available.' 23 The statute requires award-
ing authorities to evaluate each prospective general bidder within two weeks
after the final date for the submission of the application to bid. 124
The statute also requires the Deputy Commissioner to issue regulations or
guidelines governing the prequalification of a general bidder. 125 The statute
states explicitly that, to the extent possible, the criteria for evaluation be as-
signed numerical values and weights, and the applicant be assigned an overall
numerical rating on the basis of the criteria.'"
The guidelines are designed to yield accurate and uniform results
regardless of who conducts the evaluation.'" The guidelines consist of a com-
plex system of weighted categories and ability ratings. 128 As described by the
Deputy Commissioner, the system was not designed to be statistically precise,
but rather to identify patterns of competence or incompetence in a prospective
general bidder's record of performance.'" The guidelines for evaluation are
divided into four categories: (1) finished product quality; (2) performance and
accountability; (3) experience; and (4) supervisory personnel.'" Within each
category there are various factors for specific evaluation."' The "finished
product quality" category has only one factor: general quality and work-
manship.'" The guidelines, here, suggest various sources of information and
evaluators are cautioned to look for patterns of quality rather than isolated
cases.'" There are eight factors within the "performance and accountability"
category: (1) ability to manage subcontractors; (2) coordination and schedul-
ing; working relationships with (3) owner/user agency, (4) designer, (5)
subcontractors, (6) project manager; (7) construction procedures; and (8) proc-
essing paperwork. 134
 Here, the guidelines suggest that, where time permits, the
"I See id.
122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44D(3) (West Sujpp. 1980).
"3 Id.
"4 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id,
122 NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 2.
' 26 See id. at 2-8. See also Contractor Qualification Rating Form, 1 MASS. ADMIN. REGS.
29-31 (1980).
129 NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 3.
' 3° Id. at 2.
' 3 ' Id. at 2-3.
132 Id. at 4-5.
"3 Id.
134 Id. at 5-6.
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awarding authority gather information by contacting owners, architects, and
subcontractors.'" The "experience" category is divided into three factors: (1)
similar types of construction; (2) similar level of complexity; and (3) similar
dollar size of projects.'" In the "supervisory personnel" category, there are
four factors: (1) general performance; (2) general training and/or experience;
(3) experience on projects of similar type; and (4) size and complexity.'" In
describing the procedure for evaluation, the Deputy Commissioner refers
awarding authorities to specific components of the two prequalification
statements for consideration of relevant information.'"
The original guidelines developed by the Deputy Commissioner were
recently revised because they stood in conflict with the statute.'" The Deputy
Commissioner had originally required awarding authorities to apply a minimal
threshold evaluation to all prospective general bidders: 4° All prospective bid-
ders passing this minimal test were allowed to submit bids."' After receiving
bids, the awarding authority was instructed to apply the numerical evaluation,
based on the information contained in the prequalification statement and the
application to bid, to the low bidder.' 42 In order to qualify for receipt of the
contract, the low bidder had to pass a rigorous evaluation. 143 Under the revised
guidelines, the Deputy Commissioner complies with the statute and requires
awarding authorities to apply the numerical evaluation to all prospective
1 " Id.
' 36 Id. at 6-7.
'" Id. at 7-8.
' 38 See id. at 4-9. The evaluation is done in two steps. NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110,
2. Two factors are considered at a threshold level of review. First, the applicant must have the
bonding capacity to perform the project at its estimated cost. Id. at 22. Second, the applicant
must have been in business under the same name for at least one year prior to the date of applica-
tion. Id. Ineligibility to bid will result from failure to meet both of these requirements. Id. Next,
the numerical evaluation is applied. Stated as simply as possible, it is as follows: each category is
divided into several specific factors which are rated numerically, totalled, and averaged. 1 MASS.
ADMIN. REGS. 29-31 (1980). Id. That average is given a weight depending on the category. Id.
The performance and accountability rating is weighted most heavily, five times as much as either
experience or supervisory personnel. Id.
The evaluator rates an applicant's qualifications for each factor within each of the four
categories at one of five levels: unqualified (0); unsatisfactory (1); below average (2); average (3);
or above average (4). Id. Next, the factor ratings are totalled for each category and averaged,
then weighted according to category. Id. Finally, the weighted average categories are totalled to
attain the final rating. Id.
' 39 See id. at 1. The prior guidelines are published. See 1 MASS. ADMIN. REGS. 21-27
(1980) (superseded).
140 See 1 MASS. ADMIN. RECS. 21-22 (1980) (superseded). See also, NEW GUIDELINES,
supra note 110, at 1.
141 See I MASS. ADMIN. REGS. 21-22 (1980) (superseded).
' 4' See id.
143 See id. at 21-27. The former guidelines stated:
It is a two phase process in which the first phase is a "Prequalification" to bid and
the second phase is "Post-qualification" for the award of the contract. Under this
system, being prequalified to bid does not automatically qualify the Contractor for
award of the contract.
Id, at 21.
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general bidders, rather than to solely the low bidder."' The rigor of the evalua-
tion and its procedures have remained the same, despite awarding authorities
now applying the guidelines to all prospective general bidders.'"
Failure to attain a minimum numerical rating based upon the evaluation
means that an applicant will be declared ineligible to bid.' 46
 Those applicants
determined to be ineligible to bid on a project after an. adverse evaluation may
either file written objections to the determination"' or appeal in writing to the
Commissioner of Labor and Industries." 8 The Commissioner may hold a
hearing, but is not required by statute to do so.'" The Commissioner's deci-
sion is final and binding, subject to any remedies at law available to the ag-
grieved applicant.'"
Prospective general bidders who attain a score at or above the minimum
rating are then allowed to submit bids.'" From those general contractors sub-
mitting bids, the awarding authority must award the contract to the lowest
responsible and eligible bidder.' 52
 For a general bidder to be deemed respon-
sible, he need only prequalify by satisfying the minimum rating.'" Thus, all
bidders, apparently, are deemed responsible. The statute is imprecise,
however, on when a bidder is deemed eligible to receive a contract. To be eligi-
ble, a bidder must pledge to furnish appropriate labor.'" In addition, only bid-
ders not debarred are eligible. 155
 Further, the statute provides that, in order to
be eligible, a bidder must comply with the provisions of the entire competitive
bidding statute.' 56 Among the provisions of the competitive bidding statute af-
fecting bidder eligibility, there are also those which grant awarding authorities
the right to reject general bids. The statute permits awarding authorities to re-
ject bidders for a variety of technica1  violations of bidding procedure.' 57 The
statute also permits awarding authorities to reject any, or all, general bids if it
is deemed in the public interest to do so.'" When rejection is in the public in-
terest is not defined.'" Thus, the statute is unclear whether an awarding
244 See NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 1-7.
"' See id. Cf. I MASS. ADMIN. REDS. 21-27 (1980) (superseded).
NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 3. An applicant must attain a score of 70.0 to be
qualified for award of a contract. Id. Under the formula prescribed, a rating of at least
"average" is essential in the categories "finished product quality" and "performance and ac-
countability." Id. These categories are weighted heavily. See id. A rating of "below average" in
either of these categories will arithmetically disqualify the applicant. See id.
' 47 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, C44D(6) (West Supp. 1980).
148 Id. at S44D(7).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at S44D(3).
152 Id. at §44A(2).
155 Id. at $44A(1).
154 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See id. at $44E(2), (3).
15a Id. at $44E(1).
159 See id.
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authority may reject a general bidder who is deemed to be, for example, un-
qualified after a closer scrutiny of his competency even after pre-
qualification.' 60 The statute, then, does allow awarding authorities to reject
certain general bidders after prequalification, at least on technical grounds.
The extent of the right to reject general bidders, however, is unclear.
In summary, every prospective general bidder must undergo a review of
its qualifications. Prospective general bidders must comply with a two-step
disclosure. First, they must file annually a prequalification statement which in-
cludes general information regarding their business organization, financial
status, and employment history. Second, in conjunction with a desire to bid on
a particular contract, a general contractor must submit an application to bid
containing an update of the prequalification statement and more detailed infor-
mation of its qualifications for that particular contract. Using these disclosure
documents, an awarding authority evaluates all prospective general bidders ac-
cording to a complex numerical system designed to objectively analyze general
bidder qualifications. General contractors obtaining a favorable evaluation
are, then, allowed to submit bids. Although awarding authorities may yet re-
ject a general bidder, the extent of that statutory right is unclear.
C. Subbidders
Since the new competitive bidding statute retains, with incidental revi-
sions,' 61 the filed subbid system of the old law, the selection of subcontractors
remains essentially unchanged. Under the former statute, as explained
above,' 62 subcontractors were selected through a filed subbid system. Under
the filed subbid system of the former statute, the Special Commission found
that neither awarding authorities nor general contractors considered the com-
petency of subbidders. 153 The filed subbid system does not provide for a pre-
qualification evaluation as is required for prospective general bidders. The
Special Commission decided to withhold recommendation for formal qualifica-
tion review of subbidders because it believed that the practical burden of
reviewing all subbidders would make the system unworkable.'" There re-
mains, nonetheless, a discretionary power, without guidelines, by which
16° See NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, 9. The Deputy Commissioner states that:
InIothing in these GUIDELINES should be construed to require an award to a
bidder whose submitted background information, when investigated and verified
by the Awarding Authority, raises significant questions as to his ability to suc-
cessfully complete the project in question due to problems with his competence and
responsibility.
Id.
The Deputy Commissioner falls short of stating that the law permits such a rejection.
161 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44I (West 1971) (repealed 1980) with
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44F (West Supp. 1980).
162 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text for a description of filed subbidding.
' 6 ' See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text for the Special Commission's findings
regarding filed subbidding.
' 64 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 350.
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awarding authorities may evaluate subbidders. 165 The new law requires that
the question of subbidders' competency receive some consideration, but not in
the context of the filed subbid system.
Under the new law, subcontractors are subject to debarment.' 66 As noted
above, debarment may be imposed for a variety of criminal or non-criminal
conduct.I 67 A debarred subcontractor will be prohibited from bidding on public
construction contracts for a certain period of time. 168 Subcontractors are also
indirectly accounted for by the prequalification evaluation to which each pro-
spective general contractor must submit. 169 Because the general bidder's selec-
tion of subbidders is made subsequent to his qualification review,'" subbidder
qualifications do not undergo direct scrutiny during prequalification. The pre-
qualification evaluation, however, does examine a general contractor's rela-
tionship with subcontractors in the past.'" This examination, embodied in
several factors within the evaluation, creates a new incentive for general con-
tractors to be concerned about subbidders beyond their price.'" Adverse rela-
tionships with subcontractors may now affect a general contractor's ability to
prequalify.'"
The new competitive bidding statute, then, retains the filed subbid
system. Although subcontractors were not subject to any sort of evaluation in
the past under the filed subbid system, the new competitive bidding statute's
addition of debarment and prequalification to the filed subbid system effects a
slight change in the treatment of subcontractors. Debarment will prevent cer-
tain subcontractors from participating in bidding. Prequalification of general
bidders forces general bidders to consider, tangentially, their ability to com-
plete projects satisfactorily with the subcontractors they choose.
M. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Special Commission's overriding criticism of the former system of
competitive bidding' 74 was its failure appropriately to account for the qualifica-
165 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
166 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544C(1) (West Supp. 1980).
'" See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text for a description of the new debarment
mechanism.
199 See id.
169 See supra notes 102-160 and accompanying text for a description of prequalification.
"° General contractors must prequalify before they are allowed to submit bids. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44D(3) (West Supp. 1980). Filed subbidder lists are sent only to pre-
qualified general contractors. Id. at $44F(3).
171 One component of the prequalification evaluation takes into account a general con-
tractor's ability to manage subcontractors. See NEW GUIDELINES, =pa note 110, at 5-6.
172 Sec id. See also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a general discussion of a
general contractor's lack of incentive to review subbidder qualifications in the past.
179 See NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 5-6. A general contractor's score for
management of subcontractors will have an effect on his overall score. Theoretically, then, a poor
score may contribute to his failure to prequalify. See id.
174 See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text for the Special Commission's findings.
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dons of bidders before contracts were awarded. This failure to account for bid-
ders' qualifications permitted many unqualified bidders to obtain public con-
struction contracts.'" The Special Commission found that as a result of allow-
ing unqualified bidders to obtain contracts, the quality of public buildings was
poor.'" The new competitive bidding statute reacts to the Special Commis-
sion's grievance by subjecting contractor qualifications to two stages of
scrutiny. First, the new statute authorizes the Deputy Commissioner of Capital
Planning and Operations to debar general contractors and subcontractors with
seriously deficient records of management or contract performance."' Debar-
ment will ban contractors from bidding on any contract awarded under the
competitive bidding statute for a period of up to five years.'" Second, the
statute prescribes a system of disclosure and evaluation of general bidder
qualifications. General bidders annually must disclose certain information
regarding their qualifications." 9 Then, in conjunction with their desire to bid
on a particular contract, general contractors must provide awarding authorities
with certain additional, detailed information regarding their specific qualifica-
tions for that particular contract.'" Using this data, awarding authorities are
then required to evaluate the qualifications of each prospective general bidder
according to guidelines developed by the Deputy Commissioner of Capital
Planning and Operations."' The new statute, however, does not require such
disclosure and evaluation of subbidders' qualifications. 182 This section will
analyze whether the new mechanisms for evaluating bidders will be adequate
enough to prevent unqualified bidders from obtaining public construction con-
tracts. If the new mechanisms for evaluating bidders fail to prevent unqualified
bidders from obtaining contracts, then it is likely that the quality of public
buildings will continue to be poor.
Because the new competitive bidding statute subjects contractor qualifica-
tions to two stages of scrutiny, this section is divided into two subsections. The
first subsection will evaluate the likely effect of the new debarment provisions
in preventing contractors with poor records of management or contract
performance from participating in the competitive bidding system under the
new statute. The devices designed to prevent such contractors from par-
ticipating in the competitive bidding system under the former statute will be
compared to the new device of the debarment. Then, because the
Massachusetts debarment provisions are modeled on federal debarment
regulations, the Massachusetts debarment provisions will be scrutinized in
light of the operation of the federal debarment regulations. Next, this subsec-
'" See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. -
"' See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
tao See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
' 8 ' See supra notes 123-151 and accompanying text.
' 81 See supra notes 161-173 and accompanying text.
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tion draws conclusions regarding the use of debarment in Massachusetts as an
effective tool in preventing contractors with poor records of performance from
participating in public construction contract bidding. It will be submitted that
the comparative lack of federal debarments foreshadows a similar development
under Massachusetts law. Thus, debarment may not serve as an effective tool
in preserving the integrity of the bidding process. Because debarment may not
prevent contractors with poor records of performance from entering the bid-
ding competition, in the second subsection, the inquiry turns to whether the
new provisions designed to prevent unqualified contractors from bidding on
particular contracts will succeed.
The second subsection will compare the provisions which were designed to
prevent unqualified contractors from obtaining particular contracts under the
new statute. Because the new prequalification system applies to general con-
tractors and does not apply to subcontractors, this subsection will compare
separately the old and new mechanisms for preventing unqualified general
contractors from obtaining particular contracts and the old and new
mechanisms for preventing unqualified subcontractors from obtaining par-
ticular contracts. The first part of this second subsection will compare the pro-
visions awarding authorities could employ to prevent unqualified general con-
tractors from obtaining particular contracts under the former statute to the pre-
qualification provisions awarding authorities must use to prevent unqualified
general contractors from obtaining particular contracts under the new statute.
Here, a lengthy evaluation will be devoted to whether the new prequalification
provisions will, in theory or practice, root out the causes cited by the Special
Commission for the former provision's failure to prevent unqualified general
contractors from obtaining particular contractors. It will be submitted that,
while perhaps for other reasons, the causes for the former statute's failure will
endure under the new prequalification provisions and undermine its effec-
tiveness in preventing unqualified contractors from obtaining particular con-
tracts. The second part of the second subsection will compare briefly the provi-
sions useful to prevent unqualified subcontractors from obtaining particular
contracts under the former statute with the provisions useful to prevent such
subcontractors from obtaining particular contracts under the new statute. That
these provisions are virtually identical obviates the need for an extended com-
parison. Inquiry, then, turns to whether the new statute's addition of debar-
ment, which applies to general contractors and subcontractors, or prequalifica-
tion, which applies exclusively to general contractors, will reverse the Special
Commission's finding that the identical filed subbid provisions failed to
generate any scrutiny of subbidder qualifications under the former law. It will
be submitted that debarment and prequalification will not substantially in-
crease the amount of consideration given to subcontractor qualifications. Thus,
just as the Special Commission found that unqualified subbidders were award-
ed contracts and performed poorly under the former statute, the new statute
without modification will result in the award of contracts to unqualified subbid-
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ders who perform poorly. Finally, several recommendations will be made to
alter present administrative practices, or the statute itself, in order to avoid the
problems created by a failure to account for qualifications of subbidders before
contracts are awarded.
A. Preventing Contractors With Records of Poor Management and Contract Performance
From Participating in the Competitive Bidding Process
Despite its comprehensive nature,'" the debarment remedy under the
new competitive bidding statute may not be much more successful than those
express means available to the Deputy Commissioner of Capital Planning and
Operations for preventing contractors with poor records of management and
contract performance by which bidders were barred from contracting with
public agencies preexisting the new competitive bidding statute. The new
debarment remedy has several facets. Debarment under the new competitive
bidding statute may be implemented against a large number of individuals and
firms engaging in the public construction industry.'" A contractor may be
debarred for engaging in certain criminal and non-criminal activities which
tend to indicate a lack of business integrity.'" Debarment may last up to five
years depending on the seriousness of the offense, during which time a contrac-
tor is prohibited from bidding or working on public construction projects. 186
The authority to debar is centralized in the Deputy Commissioner of Capital
Planning and Operations.'" The Deputy Commissioner's authority is limited
by certain procedural rights granted by statute to contractors facing debar-
ment.'" These many facets of the new competitive bidding statute's debar-
ment remedy make the remedy far more comprehensive than that which
predates its enactment.' 89
 Before the new debarment provisions were adopted,
there were two grounds on which a contractor could be debarred from contract-
ing: violation of an administratively determined wage rate or violation of Ex-
ecutive Order 147. 190
 Debarment resulting from violation of the prevailing
wage rate only indirectly prevents contractors with poor records of perform-
ance from contracting with public agencies: 9 ' Fear of violating the prevailing
wage rate compels contractors to pay public construction workers a decent
wage. Mandating that general contractors and subcontractors pay their
laborers a decent wage for public construction work, perhaps, helps ensure the
quality of the workmanship on construction of public buildings. Yet, because
183 See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new debarment
mechanism.
184 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544C(1) (West Supp. 1980).
'" See id. at 544C(3). See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
188 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §44C(1), (7) (West Supp. 1980).
189 Id. at §44C(2), (3), (4), (5).
188
 Id. at §44(C)(5).
189 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
190 See id.
191 See 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 346.
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violations of the prevailing wage rate, at most, indirectly suggest that the of-
fenders produce a lower •quality product, such violations neither satisfactorily
measure records of performance nor sufficiently indicate abilities to adequately
perform in the future. Debarment for violations of the wage rate, therefore,
had little bearing on the quality of work performed. Debarment for violating
Executive Order 147 more closely approximates debarment under the com-
petitive bidding statute than debarment for violating the prevailing wage rate.
Under Executive Order 147, general contractors and subcontractors guilty of
certain crimes related to obtaining or performing public contracts, or reflecting
adversely on a contractor's business integrity, may be suspended or debarred
from contracting with public agencies. "2 The executive order is directed at cur-
ing the same ills as debarment under the new competitive bidding statute:
preventing contractors which have demonstrated a likelihood of performing in-
adequately from obtaining contracts. The executive order contains almost the
same procedures and standards for imposing debarment as are included within
the debarment provisions of the new competitive bidding statute.'" Despite the
presence of these procedures and standards for imposing the sanctions under
the executive order, the Special Commission found that those sanctions have
never been imposed pursuant to Executive Order 147.' 94 The presence of ar-
duous procedures and standards for imposing suspension and debarments
under the executive order, however, may have frustrated their imposition.
Likewise, the presence of procedures and standards in the new debarment pro-
visions may inhibit the number of times debarment is invoked to prevent con-
tractors with chronic performance problems from participating in public bid-
ding competition. Because Massachusetts debarment provisions were modeled
on federal debarment regulations means that similar administrative considera-
tions may apply in decisions to invoke debarment, an examination of the im-
pact which the same procedures have had on the use of debarment at the
federal level is warranted.
Authors of the new competitive bidding statute modeled its debarment
provisions on federal procurement regulations for debarment.' 95 As under
present Massachusetts law, federal debarment regulations provide that debar-
ment may not be imposed until strict procedural requirements are satisfied.' 96
Federal debarment regulations provide that a contractor facing debarment
must be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing.'" Hearings must
satisfy the demands of fairness and, at a minimum, must allow information
against the proposed action to be submitted in writing, in person or by an ap-
192 Executive Order 147 issued October 31, 1979 by Governor Dukakis.
193 See id.
194 See 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 346.
195 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 353. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41
C.F.R. 1-1.600-.607 (1981) (debarment provisions).
196 See 41 C.F.R. S1-1.604-1 (1981).
197 41 C.F.R. S1-1.604-1 (1981).
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propriate representative.'" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the leading
case of Gonzalez v. Freeman,' 99
 written by then Circuit Judge Warren Burger,
has suggested that only a full trial-type hearing will satisfy the procedural re-
quirements for federal debarments,'" while holding that a debarred contractor
had standing to sue and that debarment was subject to judicial review. 201
Under the federal procurement regulations a contractor also may be
suspended from receiving contract awards during the course of investigating
allegations of certain criminal and non-criminal acts."' Because suspension, if
prolonged, can become a de facto debarment, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in Horne Bros., Inc. v. Laird2" required that a suspended individual
or firm be given notice of the charges and an opportunity for rebuttal whenever
a substantial period of suspension is contemplated. 204 The procedural
guarantees granted for suspension in Horne Brothers are nearly as complete as
those guarantees which courts have granted firms facing debarment. 205 The
Special Commission felt that suspension prior to any hearing was an unduly
harsh measure, unnecessary to counter the risk that a contractor under suspi-
cion of serious wrongdoing might be awarded a public contract prior to debar-
ment . 2"
After surveying instances where federal debarment and suspension have
been imposed, one commentator has concluded that such actions occur infre-
quently despite the existence of an elaborate statutory and regulatory
"8 Id.
195
 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
200
 Id, at 578.
The governmental power must be exercised in accordance with basic legal norms.
Considerations of basic fairness require administrative regulations establishing
standards for debarment and procedures which will include notice of specific
charges, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses
all culminating in administrative findings and conclusions based upon the record
so made.
Id. Cf. C. Reich, "The New Property," 73 YALE L.J. 733, 755 (1969).
201 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The narrow holding of
the case was that while the statute establishing the Commodity Credit Corporation by implica-
tion authorized such debarment, Congress did not intend to authorize such debarment "without
either regulations establishing standards and a procedure which are both fair and uniform or
basically fair treatment of appellants." Id.
2 ° 2 41 C.F.R. 1-1.605 (1981) (suspension provisions).
203
 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
204 Id. at 1270-71.
205 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
206 There are numerous federal statutes and regulations which authorize debarment. In
general, eight federal statutes authorize debarment: Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. $10b(b)
(1964)), Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. $276a-2(a) (1969)), Walsh-Healy Act (41 U.S.C. $37
(1964)), Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. $7401), Service Contract Act (41 U.S.C. $354 (1970)), Water
Pollution Act (33 U.S.C. $1368 (1976)), Anti-Kickback Act (41 U.S.C. $51 (1964)), and the
Contract Work Flours Standards Act (40 U.S.C. $327 (1964)). There are also federal regulations
authorizing debarment and suspension, see Armed Services Procurement Regulation 32 C.F.R.
1-600-610 (1981), and Federal Procurement Regulations 41 "C.F.R. 1-1.600-.607 (1981).
Refinements in federal government debarment and suspension have recently been proposed. 46
Fed. Reg. 37,832 (1981). The proposal concerns: (1) establishing a consolidated list of debarred,
September 1982]	 PREVENTIVE REMEDIES	 1381
framework. 207 Moreover, several commentators have suggested that the strin-
gent procedures required for debarment are the cause for its infrequent imposi-
tion. 208 Instead, they submit, federal awarding authorities seek to accomplish
the same goal of preventing certain contractors from obtaining work by resort
to less procedurally cumbersome means. 209 Similar considerations regarding
the strict procedural requirements for imposing debarments may encourage the
Deputy Commissioner of Capital Planning and Operations in Massachusetts
to forsake debarment in favor of less procedurally strict means of frustrating at-
tempts by undesirable contractors to acquire public construction contracts
which are available. 2 t 0 Thus, because of the procedural standards which the
competitive bidding statute requires prior to its imposition, debarment may
not frequently be imposed in Massachusetts. If debarment is not imposed
without regard to its procedural requirement, contractors likely to perform in-
adequately will move on to the second stage of qualification scrutiny without
impediment. As explained below, following an analysis of the second stage of
qualification scrutiny, permitting such contractors to avoid debarment and
continue on to the prequalification phase of scrutiny may have a special
negative impact on the integrity of the entire competitive bidding process.
B. Preventing Unqualified Contractors From Obtaining a Particular Contract
Apart from the Deputy Commissioner of Capital Planning and Opera-
tions's authority to prevent contractors likely to perform inadequately from
participating in public bidding competition on a system-wide basis through
debarment, every awarding authority is accorded an opportunity to prevent
contractors from obtaining certain contracts. 2 " While the new competitive bid-
ding statute has drastically altered the procedures available to awarding
authorities for reviewing general contractor qualifications prior to the award of
a particular contract,'" it has retained those procedures which were formerly
applicable to subcontractors. 213 The divergent treatments of general contrac-
tors and subcontractors are discussed separately below.
suspended, and ineligible contractors; (2) the government-wide effect of administrative
debarments and suspensions; and (3) establishing uniform procedures for imposing ad-
ministrative debarments and suspensions. Id.
257 Steadman, " 'Banned in Boston - and Birmingham and Boise and . . . . ' Due Process in the
Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors," 27 HASTINGS L J . 793, 814-21 (1976).
"" Id. at 817. See Morgan, "Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form
to an Unconstitutional Administrative Process," 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301, 336 (1974).
203 See Steadman, supra note 207, at 814. See also Morgan, supra note 208, at 336.
210 The Deputy Commission may disqualify contractors of the prequalification stage of
scrutiny without granting contractors the procedural safeguards of debarment. See supra notes
146-150 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 102-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of provisions ap-
plicable to general contractors and supra notes 161-173 and accompanying text for provisions ap-
plicable to subcontractors.
212 See supra notes 102-160 and accompanying text and compare supra notes 11-48 and ac-
companying text.
213 See supra notes 161-173 and accompanying text.
1382	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1357
1. General Contractors
The new competitive bidding statute has made major changes in the pro-
cedures available to awarding authorities for use in preventing unqualified
general contractors from obtaining particular contracts. 214
 The former statute
gave awarding authorities no guidelines for disqualifying general bidders, but
did allow them to disqualify general bidders prior to the award of a particular
contract."' According to the Special Commission, no serious effort was made
to disqualify general bidders with poor records of performance because
authorities were fearful that they would lack the means to defend their decision
if disqualified bidders brought suits challenging their disqualifications. 216 The
lack of documentation of a general contractor's prior performance, staffing to
check references supplied by bidders, and legal counsel to frame appropriate
disqualification procedures, made the decision to disqualify a certain general
contractor particularly problematic for awarding authorities.'"
The new competitive bidding statute attempts to remedy awarding
authorities' reluctance to disqualify unqualified bidders by implementing a
two-step prequalification system for general contractors. First, all prospective
general bidders are required to submit certain information to awarding
authorities regarding their qualifications for a particular contract. 218 Second,
all awarding authorities are required to conduct an evaluation of prospective
general bidders based in part on the information supplied and according to
procedures prescribed by statute and administrative guidelines.'"
Through its requirement that all general bidders be evaluated prior to the
submission of bids, the new prequalification system provides some assurance
that only qualified general contractors will obtain public construction con-
tracts. 220 The new prequalification system requires an evaluation of every pro-
spective general bidder.'" Requiring an evaluation, in itself, assures that
awarding authorities will devote considerably more attention to the qualifica-
tions of their bidders than they had previously. Requiring an evaluation prior
to the submission of bids also should guarantee a pool of qualified bidders, to
the lowest of whom an awarding authority must award the contract.
The Special Commission cited the lack of documentation regarding a con-
tractor's record of performance available to an authority as a reason awarding
authorities questioned their ability to perform an evaluation which would hold
up in court.'" The new statute gives awarding authorities the documentation
they lacked in the past by requiring a two-step disclosure by general contrac-
214 See supra notes 102-160 and accompanying text.
215 Set supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
217 supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
221 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(3) (West Supp. 1980).
222 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 345.
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tors. First, all prospective general bidders must file an annual disclosure docu-
ment which contains certain basic business organization and financial informa-
tion. 223
 Second, prospective general bidders must file with a specific awarding
authority, in conjunction with each contract in which they have an interest, a
more detailed disclosure of their particular qualifications for that contract. 224
Together, these filings will provide awarding authorities with an enormous
amount of information about the business organization, financial status, and
performance record and capability of prospective general bidders. 225
Faced with all of this information, awarding authorities are required to
synthesize the relevant facts and figures through a complex system of weighted
categories and ability ratings for every prospective general bidder within two
weeks. 226 Because the new statute does not address the staffing inadequacies
that awarding authorities previously faced, this task may create an ad-
ministrative nightmare. With limited support staffs, awarding authorities are
asked to carry out a complex evaluation for every prospective general bidder.
Thus, compliance with the statute's prescription to carry out such an evalua-
tion for all prospective general bidders will be difficult, if not impossible. Yet, if
awarding authorities fail to comply with the statute, disappointed bidders may
sue to enforce the statute. Under the former statute, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that bidders have standing to challenge com-
pliance of an awarding authority with requirements of the law. 227 If fear of
lawsuits prevented awarding authorities from disqualifying contractors in the
past, 228
 the new statute may produce a fear of lawsuits that will make awarding
authorities hesitant to award contracts.
By requiring general contractors to provide awarding authorities with in-
formation relevant to their qualifications to perform a particular contract and
by prescribing procedures for conducting evaluations of that information, the
new prequalification system, in large part, mollifies awarding authorities' fear
that a disqualified bidder will bring a suit challenging his disqualification and,
thus, encourages awarding authorities to disqualify whichever general bidders
they deem appropriate. But because these new procedures are complex, they
may confound awarding authorities. Moreover, they may breed new fears of
litigating the validity of a disqualification of even the award of a contract.
Despite its many new procedural requirements, the new statute does nothing to
alleviate the understaffing problem cited by the Special Commission. Con-
comitantly, the new procedures require awarding authorities to evaluate
numerous prospective general bidders by a means that is likely to be labor-
intensive. The new prequalification system exacerbates the problem awarding
275
	 supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
325 Ste id.
226 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44D(3) (West Supp. 1980).
227
	 Ornamental Iron Works, Inc. v. Findler, 353 Mass. 85, 228 N.E.2d 453
(1967).
228 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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authorities had in conducting evaluations under the former statute because of
inadequate support staff. That the new Massachusetts prequalification system
is novel, then, should come as no surprise. States that prequalify bidders and
the federal government present two alternative procedures for preventing un-
qualified contractors from receiving particular contracts.
The Special Commission expressly rejected the approach used by most
states that prequalify contractors.'" Most other states that prequalify contrac-
tors do so, not for individual contracts, but for certain types of contracts on a
system-wide basis. 230 In such states, contractors interested in being considered
for public work are required to file a general prequalification statement with an
agency in advance of bidding on public projects."' In California, for example,
the agency evaluates bidders and classifies them only according to maximum
dollar amount and experience in performing public contracts."' Bidders are
then allowed only to bid on contracts of the size and type within their classifica-
tion. 235
The Special Commission believed that prequalifying contractors in a cen-
tralized classification system would produce an administrative burden on the
Division of Capital Planning and Operations. 234 This view seems ironic when
the administrative burden of a centralized classification system is compared
with the administrative burden imposed on all awarding authorities through-
out the state to evaluate every prospective general bidder each time he ex-
presses an interest in bidding on a particular contract. 235 The Special Commis-
sion acknowledged that its recommended prequalification system might pro-
duce an administrative burden on certain awarding authorities.'" The statute,
thus, expressly grants any awarding authority the right to cede its responsibili-
ty to conduct the evaluations to the Division of Capital Planning and Opera-
tions."' If awarding authorities avail themselves of this option, as might be ex-
pected from the discussion above, 238 the Division of Capital Planning and
Operations will be burdened with far more work than a centralized classifica-
tion system would have produced.
The federal system for preventing unqualified contractors from obtaining
contracts was not considered by the Special Commission. Federal government
229 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 350-51.
235 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 350-51. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
S27:7-35.1-35.12 (West Supp. 1981); CAL Gov't' CODE $14311 (West 1980) (uniform rating
system). See Note, Due Process In Public Contracts; Pre-Award Hearings To Determine Responsibility Of
Bidders, 5 PACIFIC L.J. 142, 146-48 (1979) (description of prequalification in California).
23 ' See, e.g., N.J. STAT, ANN. §27:7-35.3 (West Supp. 1981); CAL GOV'T CODE 514311
(West 1980).
232 CAL GOVT CODE 514311 (West 1980).
239
234 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 351,
2s5 See supra notes 123-160 and accompanying text.
236 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 348.
237
	 GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44D(5) (West Supp. 1980).
"a See supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
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agencies are required by statute and regulation to determine whether a par-
ticular bidder is responsible before awarding him the contract. 239 Prospective
contractors must satisfy the federal awarding authority that they are responsi-
ble. 240, This responsibility determination is made at the time a contract is
awarded, 24 ' Criteria similar to those used in Massachusetts to evaluate pro-
spective general bidders are also considered by the federal government. 242 The
federal responsibility determination, however, in no way involves a formalized
evaluation of those criteria.'"
Probably, the Special Commission assumed that the federal system would
generate no different affect on the number of unqualified contractors receiving
contracts than the then-existing system in Massachusetts.'" Neither the federal
system nor the former Massachusetts system guarantees that an awarding
authority will closely scrutinize the qualifications of a general contractor. Yet,
when compared to the triage atmosphere created by the newly prescribed pre-
qualification system,'" the federal system and former Massachusetts system
seem attractive.
The Deputy Commissioner forestalled the prequalification crisis for
almost a year by issuing guidelines that allowed awarding authorities to apply
the statutorily prescribed evaluation only to the lowest bidder. 246 This form of
evaluation was permitted, despite the express statutory requirement that the
evaluation be performed on all prospective general bidders. 247 Recently, the
guidelines were revised to conform with the statute.'" The new, revised,
guidelines leave unstated whether an awarding authority may disqualify a con-
tractor for lack of competence after accepting his bid. 249
259 See 10 U.S.C. $2305(c) (1976); 32 C.F.R. $1-902 (1981); 41 U.S.C. $253(b) (1964);
41 C.F.R. 51-2.407-2.
2" See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. $1-904 (1981); 41 C.F.R. $1-1.1202 (1981).
2" See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. $1-904 (1981).
242 See supra notes 106-160 and accompanying text for Massachusetts considerations and
compare elements included in federal responsibility determinations listed in F. LATHAM,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES 88-89 (1980). Among the federal criteria are adequate
financial resources to perform the contract and a satisfactory record of performance and integri-
ty. Id.
249
	
32 C.F.R. $1-905 (1981).
244
	 supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for a description of the discretionary
review of general contractor competency under the former Massachusetts statute. See also supra
notes 52-58 and accompanying text for the effect of the former provision.
245
	 supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
2" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44D(3) (West Supp. 1980).
248 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
249 See NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 9.
Nothing in these GUIDELINES should be construed to require an award to a bid-
der whose submitted background information, when investigated and verified by
the Awarding Authority, raise significant questions as to his ability to successfully
complete the project in question due to problems with his competence and respon-
sibility.
Id.
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The right to reject general bidders "in the public interest" would allow
awarding authorities another opportunity to prevent unqualified contractors
from obtaining the contract. 25° It is clear under the statute that only general
contractors who have received a positive evaluation are eligible to submit
bids."' The statute is unclear, however, whether an awarding authority, once
it has accepted bids, may subsequently reject the low bid on the grounds that
the bidder is unqualified. An awarding authority may desire to reject a bidder
subsequent to prequalification if new facts arise which cast a negative light on
whether the bidder can properly perform. Awarding authorities are directed to
award contracts to the "lowest responsible and eligible general bidder. "252 A
general contractor satisfies the responsibility element by successful pre-
qualification. 253
 To be deemed eligible, a general contractor must meet all the
requirements of the competitive bidding statute, not be debarred, and must
make certain promises regarding his ability to furnish appropriate labor for the
work. 254
 One determination of eligibility is made prior to the submission of
bids in conjunction with the satisfactory completion of the prequalification
process. 255
 Subsequent to that determination, authorities are permitted to re-
ject individual bids received if they are "incomplete, conditional, or
obscure." 256
 Of course, a contractor can be debarred subsequent to the sub-
mission of a bid and that debarment would prohibit his receipt of the contract.
Among the grounds for debarment is if the contractor willfully supplies
materially false information to the awarding authority during the prequalifica-
tion process."' Finally, any materially false statement in the prequalification
disclosure documents may, in the discretion of the awarding authority, result
in the termination of any contract awarded to the contractor based on these
documents. 258
 Thus, the statute does not expressly permit an awarding
authority to reject a bidder solely on the grounds that he is unqualified. The
statute does, however, state that "[i]n inviting bids, the awarding authority
shall reserve the right to reject any or all such general bids, if it be in the public
interest to do so." 259
 Obviously, resolution of the question whether a lack of
competence justifies rejection of a bid in the public interest would clarify the
statute. The Massachusetts courts, however, have not set out the appropriate
parameters of public interest justifications for the rejection of general bids. In-
tuitively, the right to reject general bids submitted by unqualified bidders
25° See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch .
149, S44E(1) (West Supp. 1980).
251 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544D(3), (4) (West Supp. 1980). See also supra
notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
232
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, S44A(2) (West Supp. 1980).
2" Id. at S44A(1) (definition of "Responsible").
256 Id. at S44A(1) (definition of "Eligible").
2" Id. at %44D(3).
266 Id. at %44E(2).
257 at S44C(3)(b).
228 Id. at S44D(1)(a).
259
 Id. at $44E(1).
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seems well within the scope of the public interest, especially in light of the new
statute's focus on preventing unqualified contractors from obtaining contracts.
If this right to reject is recognized, it must be limited to circumstances where
new facts have come to the attention of the awarding authority that sufficiently
compel reversal of the determination that the contractor was prequalified.
Otherwise, an awarding authority could circumvent the prequalification
system by performing its qualification evaluation solely on the low bidder. To
remain consistent with the statute, then, this right to reject, if recognized,
should force an awarding authority to resubmit the bidder to the prequalifica-
tion evaluation taking into account the new information in its possession. If the
bidder then fails to attain a minimum level of competence, he should be re-
jected.
In order to avert what it perceived to be certain procedural problems, the
Special Commission intentionally recommended that the evaluation of qualifi-
cations take place prior to the submission of bids and that the evaluation be
highly structured. 26° The Special Commission believed that the practice of
evaluating a contractor only after it was identified as the low bidder increased
the likelihood that rejection of the bidder would be challenged and result in
litigation. 26 ' By requiring the development of standard procedures for evalua-
tion, 262
 the Special Commission sought to prevent biased or arbitrary ad-
ministration of the system, presumably to avoid judicial reversal of adverse
qualification evaluations. 263
Without the right to reject unqualified bidders, however, awarding
authorities will not achieve the goal of the new competitive bidding statute
which is to prevent unqualified contractors from receiving public construction
contracts. Moreover, the right to reject unqualified bidders will assuage the dif-
ficulties awarding authorities will experience in attempting to carry out the
prescriptions of the prequalification evaluation. 264 If in the rush to prequalify
bidders, one should slip through, the awarding authority would have another
opportunity to reject.
By examining debarment at the federal level, it was suggested that Massa-
chusetts debarment will not be invoked frequently because of the rigid pro-
cedural rights that attach to the decision to debar. If debarment is, in fact, in-
frequently invoked, then the ability of highly undesirable contractors to escape
debarment may present special problems for awarding authorities at the pre-
qualification stage of scrutiny.
Commentators have suggested that instead of imposing debarment,
federal officials have sought less procedurally cumbersome means of prevent-
260
 See 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 346.
261 Id. See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Division v. State Division of Administration, 367
So. 2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1979).
267
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §44D(3) (West Supp. 1980).
263 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 351.
264
 See supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
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ing undesirable contractors from obtaining contracts. 265 A less procedurally
cumbersome means might be possible at the federal level, as federal respon-
sibility determinations demand far less, if any, procedural requirements before
rejecting undesirable contractors. 266 Under federal regulations, there are no
specific procedures for responsibility determinations. 262 In addition, one
federal court has held that the requirements of due process are inapplicable to
responsibility determinations.'" Similarly, federal courts have recently held
that judicial relief is available for the resolution of bid protests, only in extreme
cases where the procurement determination was without rational basis. 269
Where adverse responsibility determinations take the place of debarment,
however, certain procedural rights may arise. Federal courts have tolerated a
number of consecutive adverse responsibility determinations regarding the
same contractor, on apparently similar grounds, and have not required these
determinations to meet the rigorous procedural standards of debarment."° In
the opinion of the comptroller general, however, debarment procedures must
be invoked when successive nonresponsibility determinations take place. 2 "
Otherwise, a contracting agency may continuously disqualify bidders without
affording them an opportunity to be heard. 272 At least one federal court has
reasoned that an awarding authority may not bypass important procedural
safeguards merely by omitting a formal label to the sanction applied. 223 The
court found that the fact that an awarding authority did not label its action a
"debarment" was inconsequential to the nature of the procedures which
should accompany that action. 274 The same procedural considerations should
apply to such "de facto" debarments accomplished through the prequalifica-
don system in Massachusetts.
Conducting the prequalification evaluation, Massachusetts awarding
authorities are under no statutory obligation to conduct any hearing prior to
disqualifying a prospective bidder. 225 Any contractor disqualified by the pre-
qualification evaluation may appeal the awarding authority's determination. 276
The appeal, however, is very limited. Within two days after a contractor
receives notice of his disqualification, he may appeal in writing to the Commis-
265 See supra note 208.
266 See 41 C.F.R. 51-1.1205 (1981).
261 See id.
266 Lapham, supra note 242, citing Commerical Envelope Mfg. Co., Inc. v. John
Dunlop, No. 1573, (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
269 M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Wheela-
brator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27° Lapham, supra note 242, citing Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., Inc. v. John
Dunlop, No. 1573, (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
271 43 COMP. GEN. 140 (1963).
272 Id. at 141.
27 ' Myers & Myers, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252, 1259 (2d Cir. 1975).
2" Id.
"5 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, 544D(3), (6), (7) (West Supp. 1980).
276 Id. at 544D(7).
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sioner of Labor and Industries. 277 The commissioner reviews the decision and
issues a written opinion.'" In the commissioner's discretion a hearing may be
held, but a hearing by no means is guaranteed. 279 A contractor who is
repeatedly disqualified is not guaranteed a hearing on the validity of those deci-
sions, unless he can persuade the Massachusetts courts to adopt the reasoning
of the federal courts and comptroller general that "de facto" debarment en-
titles a contractor to the debarment procedures. Massachusetts courts may
easily be persuaded that the procedural considerations given to de facto debar-
ment at the federal level are equally applicable in Massachusetts. Where
awarding authorities reject the lowest bidder on the grounds that he is un-
qualified, courts may be especially receptive to due process concerns. On the
one hand, in cases where a low bidder is rejected, the rejection is the bidder's
only obstacle to receipt of the contract. 28 ° On the other hand, where an award-
ing authority disqualifies a prospective bidder, the prospective bidder has
merely been denied a right to bid on a contract."' At that point, there is no
means of determining whether the prospective bidder would have ever received
the contract. Thus, awarding authorities may encounter challenges to their dis-
qualification of a prospective bidder if that bidder has been repeatedly dis-
qualified in the past and never been given an opportunity to be heard. As a
result, awarding authorities may hesitate to disqualify prospective bidders,
fearing a lawsuit charging denial of due process.
2. Subcontractors
Any potential for improving the quality of public construction brought by
Massachusetts' new competitive bidding statute is seriously undermined by the
statute's treatment of subbidders. 252 The filed subbid system of the old law is
retained in the new competitive bidding statute. 283 By retaining the filed subbid
system of the old Iaw, the new statute inherits some of its predecessor's prob.
lems."4 Under the new statute, just as before, it is likely that the quality of a
subbidder's previous work will not be taken into account in determining
whether that subbidder works on a public construction project. 285 Further,
where an unqualified or irresponsible subcontractor fails to perform properly,
just as before, the general contractor will not likely be held accountable in the
277 Id,
278 Id.
229 Id.
288 See id. at 544A(2).
281 See id. at S4417)(3).
282 See supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text for a description of the filed subbid
system.
284 See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text for the Special Commission's assess-
ment of the filed subbid system.
"' See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
1390	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1357
future for that poor performance. 286
 This section of the note first will describe
why these familiar problems are likely to persist. Then, whether the new
statute's addition of debarment or the prequalification system for general con-
tractors will increase the attention subbidder qualifications receive over what
attention they received in the past will be considered. Finally, this section will
recommend alternative evaluation procedures by which subcontractors' quali-
fications will receive appropriate consideration prior to the award of a contract.
The new competitive bidding statute has kept the filed subbid system of
the former statute. The filed subbid system allows the awarding authority to
examine the competency of subbidders before they are placed on a list of eligi-
ble subbidders, but does not require such an appraisa1. 287
 The history of discre-
tionary authority to examine the qualifications of contractors in Massachusetts,
studied by the Special Commission, indicates that most awarding authorities
have neither the staffing nor the expertise to design or carry out such an evalua-
tion. 288
 This history is particularly significant in connection with the discre-
tionary authority to examine subbidder qualifications. 289
 The period within
which the awarding authority may evaluate subbidders was, and still is, only
two days.'" Because the new statute has retained the filed subbid system of the
old statute regardless of its failures, it is probable that awarding authorities will
still fail to review the qualifications of subbidders.
Although awarding authorities may not review the qualifications of sub-
bidders, the new competitive statute authorizes the Deputy Commissioner of
Capital Planning and Operations to debar subcontractors for a variety of
misconducts, including a record of poor performance."' As noted above,
however, it is unlikely that debarment frequently will be invoked because of the
rigid procedural standards it requires.'" Thus, debarment may not prevent
adequately even the least desirable subcontractors from obtaining a contract.
Yet, because of the new statute's prequalification requirements general con-
tractors may show a new interest in the competency of their subcontractors,
despite the indifference of public authorities.
Under the former statute, general contractors, just as awarding author-
ities, were unlikely to evaluate the qualifications of subbidders. 293 General con-
tractors were forced by the filed subbid system either to select subbidders ex-
clusively on the basis of price, regardless of competence, or face a serious risk of
losing the contract to a more price-conscious general bidder.'" The general
bidder was aware that among all his competitors, at least one would choose the
286 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
2B'
	 GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, §44E(1) (West Supp. 1980).
268 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 344.
299 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-3.
290 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §44F(3) (West Supp. 1980).
2" Id. at S44C(3)(b).
292 See supra notes 183-210 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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lowest subbidders on the list."' Further, because general contractors were not
held accountable for their subcontractors through any sort of prequalification
process, there was no incentive for them to review the past performance of sub-
bidders. 296 The new competitive bidding statute's prequalification system
creates an incentive for general contractors to study the competency of listed
subbidders before selecting a subbidder to include in the general bid.
The new prequalification system, to a certain degree, forces the general
contractor to consider the qualifications of his subcontractors. Under the
former statute, general contractors rarely underwent any formal or informal
evaluation of their past performance before receiving a contract."' Therefore,
a general contractor could maximize his opportunity for obtaining a contract
by selecting the lowest subbidders, regardless of their abilities. 298 Now, general
contractors are subject to a rigorous prequalification evaluation. 299 Significant-
ly, such prequalification evaluations take place before a general bid is submitted
and thus in no way affect which subbidders a general bidder selects for the par-
ticular bid. The general contractor's concern, then, is limited to his ability to
prequalify in the future if he chooses incompetent subcontractors for the pres-
ent contract. This concern is real because the prequalification evaluation
focuses, in small part, on the general contractor's history of dealings with sub-
contractors.'" Presently, the evaluation devotes very little attention to such
past dealings with subcontractors. In the evaluation there are four categories
rated. Subcontractors are considered as one of eight factors within the "Per-
formance and Accountability" category."' This attention, although slight,
creates a greater incentive, now, for a general contractor to consider the com-
petency of subbidders before making his selection, than existed previously. It is
uncertain whether this small component in the prequalification evaluation will
provide so significant an impetus that a general contractor would forego a low
subbidder with questionable qualifications in favor of a higher subbidder with
ample qualifications and run the risk of losing the contract based on price.
Thus, there is a possibility that general contractors, just as awarding
authorities, will not consider the qualifications of subbidders even under the
new competitive bidding statute.
Absent any modification, the new competitive bidding statute may con-
tinue to permit unqualified subcontractors to obtain work in the public con-
struction industry and thus, undermine the quality of public buildings. The
subcontractor who continually submits the low bid will only have to avoid
debarment in order to continually obtain public contracts. As noted above, it
195 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
299 Id.
299 See supra notes 102-150 and accompanying text.
30° Set supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
901 See, NEW GUIDELINES, supra note 110, at 5-6.
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appears that debarment will seldom be invoked. 302
 The general contractor,
unless held accountable for the work of his subcontractors, has no incentive to
select especially competent subcontractors, but instead is inclined to choose
subcontractors exclusively on the basis of price. As a result, the quality of
public construction probably will suffer as long as the filed subbid system con-
tinues in operation without modification.
To evaluate the validity of any modification of the filed subbid system, it is
necessary first to acknowledge that the entrenched policy preferences of
preventing bid shopping and bid peddling are necessary elements of any
statutory scheme."' There are a number of modifications which could alleviate
the problems the new competitive bidding statute will have in ensuring the
selection of competent subcontractors, while continuing to discourage bid
shopping and bid peddling.
A simple legislative amendment to the competitive bidding statute would
provide a partial solution to the problem of selecting competent subcontractors.
The amendment would require that awarding authorities evaluate the qualifi-
cations of prospective bidders on subcontracts estimated to cost above a certain
dollar amount. The amount could be left to the discretion of the awarding
authority, but in no event could it exceed a certain statutorily determined
amount. The procedures and criteria for such an evaluation could be pre-
scribed by the Deputy Commissioner of Capital Planning and Operations and
be less rigorous than those in place for the evaluation of general contractors. 3"
A flexible dollar amount accompanied by procedures for evaluations by the
Deputy Commissioner would encourage awarding authorities to undertake
such evaluations by reducing the administrative burdens that presently exist if
an awarding authority elects to evaluate subbidders. 305 Not all subbidders
would have their qualifications evaluated, only those for which bids were an-
ticipated to exceed a certain dollar amount. Instead of receiving no guidance
for evaluating subcontractors, 306
 certain subbidders' qualifications would be
reviewed by an evaluation formulated by the Deputy Commissioner. This
amendment, while not a complete solution to the problem of selecting subcon-
tractors, at least ensures that major subcontracts would be awarded to respon-
sible and qualified subcontractors.
A more comprehensive reform would be to repeal filed subbidding. The
Special Commission originally recommended that a bid listing system,
402 See supra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
403 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 102-150 and accompanying text for a description of the evaluation pro-
cedures and criteria used for general contractors.
3 ° 5 See supra notes 222-228 and accompanying text.
"6 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $§44E, 44F (West Supp. 1980). See supra notes
163-164 and accompanying text for a discussion of an awarding authority's ability to review the
qualifications of subbidders.
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modeled on federal procurement law, 3°7
 replace filed subbidding. 3" The
Massachusetts legislature rejected this option. 3" A bid listing system would
have required general contractors to list in their bids the subcontractors who
would work on the project and would have required performance by the listed
subcontractors as a condition to the general contract.") The awarding authori-
ty would not, then, solicit subbids. Under federal regulations, the General
Services Administration requires such listing of subcontractors in general
bids.'" Several states also require bid listing.'" Bid listing allows a general
contractor to have more authority over its subcontractors than filed subbid-
ding, by removing the awarding authority, to a large extent, from the subcon-
tractor selection process. With the greater authority, a general contractor
would likewise face greater accountability for the work of its subcontractors.
Thus, the general contractor would select subcontractors with satisfactory
records of performance. Bid listing is also designed to combat the practice of
bid shopping and peddling by requiring that geheral contractors use the sub-
contractors listed in the general bid as a condition of the contract.'" Bid listing,
in itself, however, will not control bid shopping that takes place before the
award of a contract.
While a bid listing system alone does not address the problem of bid shop-
ping and bid peddling that occurs before the general contract is awarded, bid
listing under the Massachusetts statute could prevent such practices. The
statute's debarment mechanism and evaluation pose obstacles to bid shopping
and bid peddling by the general contractor prior to the contract award. To
begin, the general contractor is no longer chosen without regard to his
qualifications. 314 Accordingly, a general contractor risks future debarment, or,
at least, disqualification from one contract award, by soliciting cut rate subbids
that lead to unsatisfactory performance. Because of the reforms of the new
statute, then, abandonment of the filed subbid system is not likely to promote
bid shopping or bid peddling. Therefore, the Massachusetts legislature has less
reason to cling to the filed subbid system. Achieving legislative change in this
direction may still be difficult, however, given the likely opposition of the sub-
907
 41 C.F.R. $5B-2.202-70 (1981). 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 339.
308 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 339.
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, $44F (West Supp. 1980).
310 See e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE $S4101, 4107 (West 1980).
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 41 C.F.R. $5b-2.202-70 (1981). See FINAL REPORT at 335-39.
312 States that required bid listing include California (CAL. GOV'T CODE $4104 (West
1980)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. $52:32-2 (West Supp. 1982)), New York (N.Y. STATE
FIN. LAW $138 (McKinney 1940)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. (1958 repl.) 5143-128),
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313 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 335. See Comment, Construction Bidding Problem: Is
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3 ' 4 See supra notes 109-150 and accompanying text.
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contracting trades. 315 Still, other more politically feasible reforms may ensure
the selection of competent subcontractors.
Rather than establishing a bid listing system, there are less drastic admin-
istrative modifications of the filed subbid system which would focus more atten-
tion on the competence of subbidders during the bidding process than is the
case under the current filed subbid system. The Deputy Commissioner of
Capital Planning and Operations has general authority under the statute to
promulgate non-binding guidelines for evaluating subbidders.'" The statute
also grants the Deputy Commissioner broad discretion to formulate relevant
factors for use in evaluating prospective general bidders.'" Under these
powers, the Deputy Commissioner could introduce a separate category to
evaluate general contractors based upon a contractor's past relationships with
subcontractors. The evaluation could be made by awarding authorities or by
both awarding authorities and general contractors.
The promulgation of guidelines for the evaluation of subbidder qualifica-
tions will encourage awarding authorities to undertake such evaluations
although they will be under no obligation to do so. Under the statute, an
awarding authority may require a subbidder to supply any information rele-
vant to making a determination of that subcontractor's competence. 3 l 5 Just
what that information should be and what form the evaluation should take is
left for the expert consideration of the Deputy Commissioner. In the past,
awarding authorities were reluctant to review the qualifications of general bid-
ders and subbidders when such review was optional. 319 This reluctance was
generated by a lack of staffing to conduct the investigations and a fear of
lawsuits arising out of adverse determinations resulting in disqualification."°
Non-binding guidelines will offer awarding authorities the opportunity to ad-
minister a standard evaluation. But because awarding authorities still may
have inadequate staffing to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of subbidders,
the guidelines should allow such an evaluation to be capable of quick comple-
tion and accuracy. The structured suggestions of the Deputy Commissioner
may bolster an awarding authority's willingness to undertake an evaluation
and serve as a vehicle for the awarding authority to provide ample support for
its conclusions.
The statute also grants the Deputy Commissioner broad discretion in
structuring the procedures and criteria for evaluation of a general contractor's
qualifications for a particular contract."' While the statute supplies certain
criteria for evaluation, the Deputy Commissioner may, at his option, elect to
include other relevant criteria. Such an additional criterion for evaluation
" 5 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 339-40.
3" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, 544E (West Supp. 1980).
3'r
	 at 544D.
3 " Id. at 544F.
3 " 8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 293, 344-46.
320 Id. at 346.
921
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §44D (West Supp. 1980).
September 1982)	 PREVENTIVE REMEDIES	 1395
might be the record of the general contractor in dealings with subcontractors.
This criterion would involve inquiry into whether the general contractor has
selected reliable subcontractors in the past and whether the general contractor
selected subcontractors who habitually caused performance delays, disputes or
other problems. This factor could be included in the "finished product
quality" category of the evaluation. 322 With the added criterion, a general con-
tractor, though choosing from among listed subcontractors, would have a
strong motivation to select a qualified, as well as low-priced, subcontractor.
The desire of the general contractor to use a particular subcontractor by pursu-
ing solely low-priced subbids would be moderated by his concomitant desire to
remain eligible to bid on future contracts. These administrative proposals for
modification of the present filed subbid system would increase the tension be-
tween qualifications and prices of subbidders.
While the proposed legislative amendments would have a much more
direct effect, the suggested administrative modifications may significantly im-
prove the quality of workmanship in the subtrades on public construction proj-
ects. Absent revision, administrative or legislative, the promise for quality
public construction commenced by the new competitive bidding statute prob-
ably will be defeated by the work of incompetent subcontractors.
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts' new competitive bidding statute includes two procedures
by which general contractors likely to perform poorly may be prevented from
obtaining public construction contracts, by debarment and by an adverse out-
come on a prequalification evaluation. Subcontractors, though subject to
debarment, escape any formal prequalification evaluation. While these pro-
cedures may improve the quality of work performed under Massachusetts'
public construction contracts, there are three weaknesses in the new com-
petitive bidding statute which may prevent it from achieving its goal of improv-
ing the quality of public buildings.
First, debarment may not be used frequently because of the procedural re-
quirements now associated with debarment and which later may attach to
adverse qualification evaluations. The federal experience indicates an admin-
istrative reluctance to impose debarment because of the stiff procedural
guarantees associated with it. If debarment is not used, then the burden of
screening out unqualified and irresponsible contractors will fall to the prequali-
fication process.
Second, the prequalification system for general contractors required by
statute and prescribed by guidelines is very complex. Although the disclosure
required will supply awarding authorities with adequate information, the pro-
cedures for synthesizing and evaluating that information do not account for the
lack of adequate staffing of awarding authorities. As a result, awarding
322
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authorities may have a very difficult time adhering to the rigorous prequalifica-
tion evaluation procedures. Thus, knowing that they have not followed the
prescribed evaluation procedures, awarding authorities may be reluctant to
disqualify an unqualified prospective bidder.
Third, subcontractors' qualifications were not exposed to scrutiny in the
past and it is dubious whether the new competitive bidding statute will alter
this lack of scrutiny in the future. The new statute requires formal review by
neither the awarding authority nor the general contractor. A general contractor
may have an incentive to choose only responsible subcontractors because of the
potential impact poor performance on the part of a subcontractor may have on
the general's ability to obtain public construction contracts in the future. There
is no reason to believe, however, that awarding authorities will undertake such
an evaluation. Without modification, the statute leaves great potential for un-
qualified subcontractors to undermine the quality of public construction.
These weaknesses will not necessarily be fatal to the well-intentioned
system. At the foundation of the new preventive remedies lies debarment.
While not frequently imposed at the federal level, it is essential that state ad-
ministrators make prudent use of debarment to prevent the chronic malper-
formers in the construction industry from obtaining public contracts. Pre-
qualification, then, can be used to ensure that contractors, who are generally
competent, are specifically competent for each contract. The prequalification
evaluation, however, is far more rigorous than it need be. As presently de-
signed, it imposes an unduly heavy administrative burden on awarding
authorities in complete disregard of the Special Commission's recognition that
under the old system most awarding authorities lacked sufficient staffing to
undertake general contractor evaluations. Several recommendations were set
forth which are aimed at reducing this administrative burden. At least until
certain adjustments are made in the prequalification evaluation, it is essential
that courts recognize an awarding authority's right to reject a general bidder,
as opposed to a prospective general bidder, for a limited number of reasons
under the present statute. Finally, in order to protect the integrity of public
buildings, the qualifications of subcontractors must be subjected to review,
either by placing the direct responsibility for performance by subcontractors
squarely on general contractors or by requiring awarding authorities to under-
take evaluation of subcontractor qualifications under certain circumstances.
With these adjustments, the competitive bidding statute will achieve its goal of
constructing quality public buildings at the lowest possible price.
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